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In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls argues for a view which he 
entitles "justice as fairness," according to which the principles of a 
just social organization are those which would be chosen by the 
members of society in an original position of fairness. Rawls's 
framing of this original position has had a great intuitive appeal, 
perhaps because it incorporates the ideals of rationality and 
impartiality that are central to our everyday understanding of justice. 
However, the principles which Rawls derives from this starting-
point appear to depart radically from many commonly held and 
intuit ive beliefs about jus t ice and the aims of social 
organizations.While I find Rawls's conception of the original 
position to be uniquely compelling, I believe that there is something 
to be said for a somewhat more conservative conception of justice. 
Rawls himself acknowledges the possible independence of the 
original position from the substantive principles which he endorses, 
pointing out that 
justice as fairness, like other contract views, 
consists of two parts: (1) an interpretation of the 
initial situation and of the problem of choice posed 
there, and (2) a set of principles which, it is argued, 
would be agreed to. One may accept the first part 
of the theory (or some variant thereof), but not the 
other, and conversely, [p. 15] 
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In this paper, I hope to use the original position to advocate a 
conception of justice which is somewhat less egalitarian than the 
one which Rawls develops. Central to this task will be the claim 
that parties in the original position would indeed prefer this 
conception of justice to Rawls's own. 
Prima Facie Objections to Rawls's Principles of Justice 
Before proceeding with arguments from the original position, 
I would like to bring up a few pre-philosophical objections to 
Rawls's principles. Let us consider Rawls's two principles of justice 
as formulated at the end of section 13 under the interpretation of 
"Democratic Equality." 
1. Each person is to have an equal right to the 
most extensive basic liberty compatible with 
a similar liberty for others, [p. 60] 
2. Social and economic inequalities are to be 
arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest 
benefit of the least advantaged [the difference 
principle] and (b) attached to offices and 
positions open to all under conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity, [p. 83] 
Rawls writes that these principles have a lexical structure—the first 
principle must be satisfied before we can take steps to satisfy the 
second principle. This ordering also requires that any steps taken 
to satisfy the second principle must be in accordance with the first 
principle. 
The first principle of equal liberty and the requirement in 2(b) 
of fair equality of opportunity should be familiar and persuasive to 
most citizens of contemporary constitutional democracies. 
However, the difference principle of 2(a) marks Rawls's departure 
from the mainstream of contemporary political discourse. What I 
would like to call attention to, in particular, is Rawls's insistence 
on the injustice of certain kinds of inequality. For instance, on page 
THE SOCIAL SAFETY NET 109 
62 he observes that his specific principles represent a more general 
conception of justice which includes the idea that, "Injustice, then, 
is simply inequalities that are not to the benefit of all." Rawls claims 
a classical inspiration for this account in Aristotle's sense of justice 
as refraining from pleonexia; nonetheless, I submit that this is a 
highly unconventional view of injustice. 
For instance, in our own society, there are great economic 
inequalities, such that some have much more than they require to 
support themselves and their families, while many others live in 
poverty, without access to employment, proper nutrition, or 
adequate medical care. There are a number of reasons why one 
might find this situation unsatisfactory. On a Rawlsian account this 
system is unjust, presumably because these inequalities are not to 
the benefit of the least advantaged. However, I would like to argue 
that what disturbs us about this situation is not the presence of 
inequalities perse; instead it is the presence of poverty in a society 
which is prosperous enough to provide a decent standard of living 
for all of its members. What arouses our sense of injustice, then, is 
not simply that there are inequalities; but rather that these 
inequalities result in unnecessary want and suffering which could 
be avoided through a more humane economic and political system. 
Or imagine a society in which everyone's basic material needs 
are satisfied, and in which there are a few lucky individuals who 
enjoy a greater share of wealth than do the others. This would be a 
society with inequalities which presumably are not all to the benefit 
of the least advantaged, but in which these inequalities do not result 
in unnecessary deprivation. Compare this society with another 
society, in which everyone's basic material needs are satisfied and 
no one enjoys any wealth above this basic standard of living. There 
may be reasons to prefer one society over the other: one might 
suggest that the second society will enjoy a more democratic spirit, 
while another might say that the first society is more conducive to 
the pursuit of beautiful art and literature. However, I am not certain 
that justice demands that we prefer the second society to the first, 
as Rawls's emphasis on inequality appears to require. Even if 
surpluses are inequalities which benefit only their possessors and 
which are assigned in a morally arbitrary manner, it seems almost 
spiteful to insist that no one ought to enjoy them. 
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The Social Safety Net and the Original Position 
With these objections in mind, I would like to advocate an 
alternative conception of justice, which I take to be based on a 
more moderate idea: that of the "social safety net." I interpret this 
as involving the idea that there is a basic minimum of material 
goods that individuals require to lead satisfactory lives, and as 
stating that just social institutions should guarantee this minimum, 
within reason, to those who abide by those institutions. In situations 
in which it is not possible to guarantee this minimum standard to 
all, I believe that this ideal would require a society to provide this 
standard of living to as many of its members as possible. Such a 
conception of justice might be formulated with the following lexical 
structure: 
1 E a c h person is to have an equal right to the 
most extensive basic liberty compatible with 
a similar liberty for others. 
2 ' . When possible, each person is to have 
reasonable access to a satisfactory minimum 
material standard of living, 
OR 
When this is not possible, as many people as 
is possible are to have reasonable access to a 
satisfactory minimum material standard of 
living. 
3 \ After 1' and 2 ' are satisfied, social and 
economic inequalities are to be allowed so 
long as these inequalities are attached to 
offices and positions open to all under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity. 
In order to argue for this conception, it is necessary to 
demonstrate that these principles would be chosen by individuals 
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in the original position of fairness. Let us review the basic features 
of this original position. As Rawls writes, the guiding idea of justice 
as fairness is 
that the principles of justice for the basic structure 
of society are the object of the original agreement. 
They are the principles that free and rational 
persons concerned to further their own interests 
would accept in an original position of equality as 
defining the fundamental terms of their association, 
[p. 11] 
Perhaps the most controversial element in Rawls's conception of 
the original position is the stipulation that the principles of justice 
be chosen by parties behind a "veil of ignorance." Parties in the 
original position are (or must imagine themselves to be) unaware 
of particular individual facts such as their place in society, their 
fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, their 
conception of the good, and the special features of their respective 
individual psychologies (such as their aversion to risk or their 
tendency to pessimism or optimism). These restrictions on their 
knowledge are necessary, Rawls argues, to ensure that no one can 
tailor the principles of justice to suit his or her own personal 
circumstances, and also to ensure that no one is advantaged or 
disadvantaged by fortune or social circumstances in his or her choice 
of principles. Furthermore, the parties in the original position are 
unaware of the particular circumstances of their own society: its 
political or economic situation, its level of civilization and culture, 
and to which generation in a society they belong. This is because 
issues of justice can arise between generations just as they can 
arise between individuals; and also because, at least on the Kantian 
interpretation developed in §40, the choice of principles should be 
independent of contingencies such as the level of societal progress 
or economic abundance. More mundanely, one might point out that 
the principles of justice should hold regardless of current social or 
economic circumstances. 
So what do the parties in the original position know? According 
to Rawls, there are no limits to general information: they have access 
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to political and economic theory and the laws of human psychology, 
and an understanding of the basis of social organization. More than 
that, they know that they live under the "circumstances of justice," 
the conditions under which human cooperation is both possible 
and necessary. I assume the circumstances of justice to include the 
fact that people require some basic minimum of material goods in 
order to lead satisfactory existences—without this assumption, the 
parties could not make sense of the principles which I have 
endorsed. 
The parties in the original position would consider, among other 
factors, the different life expectations available to different 
representative individuals under these two competing conceptions 
of justice. Let us examine three general circumstances: societies in 
which there are not enough resources to guarantee a satisfactory 
life for all, societies in which there are just enough resources to 
guarantee a satisfactory life for all, and societies in which there are 
more than enough resources to guarantee a satisfactory life for all. 
To do so, I will attempt to diagram the life expectations available 
to each representative individual in a society. The following is a 
diagram of a society which does not have enough resources to 
provide all of its members a satisfactory standard of living. (The 
worst-off representative individual is on the left-most side—moving 
rightward I diagram gradually better-off individuals until, at the 
far right, we have the most favored representative individual in the 
society.) The dotted line represents a minimum satisfactory material 
standard of living. 
Diagram 1: Insufficient resources 
individuals under Democratic Equality individuals under a social safety net 
Under conditions of insufficient resources, the position of the 
worst-off is higher under Democratic Equality than under the social 
safety net. However, the social safety net does have a lower 
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boundary, provided by the principle of equal liberty—the worst-
off are not to be exploited, and slavery (which, it has been argued, 
would be permitted by utilitarianism) is prohibited. Also, as would 
be expected, there are more individuals at or above a satisfactory 
standard of living under the social safety net than under Democratic 
Equality. While Rawls's principles would be favored by the worst-
off, the social safety net would be favored by those in the middle. 
Diagram 2: Sufficient resources 
individuals under Democratic Equality individuals under a social safety net 
Under conditions in which resources are just sufficient to 
provide a satisfactory life for all, Rawls's principles of Democratic 
Equality and those I have presented as the social safety net yield 
roughly the same distribution. While Rawls's principles look for 
the best possible position for the worst-off and find the satisfactory 
minimum, the social safety net looks for the worst-off group which 
can be brought up to the satisfactory material minimum and finds 
the worst-off group in society. 
Diagram 3: More than sufficient res 
individuals under Democratic Equality individuals under a social safety net 
When there are more resources than necessary to raise all 
members of society to a satisfactory standard of living, no specific 
distribution or pattern can be predicted for the social safety net. 
Thus, the diagram on the right is somewhat arbitrary—in theory, 
any distribution with all members of society above the minimum 
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bar is acceptable. However, on the whole we might expect greater 
inequalities than under Rawls's principles, owing to the uneven 
distribution of natural talents. 
Even given this analysis and our understanding of the original 
position, it is still not immediately clear how the parties will choose 
one conception of justice over another. Rawls argues that parties in 
the original position should reason from the position of the worst-
off in society. If this is so, then the parties would have reason to 
prefer Democratic Equality over the social safety net, because in 
the two cases in which the competing conceptions differ (that is, in 
cases of less than and more than sufficient abundance), the worst-
off are better off under Rawls's principles than under those I have 
presented. But why should the parties in the original position 
consider only the position of the least advantaged? It seems almost 
foolish for the parties to make a choice that will affect the entire 
basic structure of society by solely considering the interests of one 
group. 
Rawls argues that the parties will reason from the position of 
the worst-off because, in the original position, rational parties will 
adopt the maximin rule. However, I believe that a closer 
examination of the original position and Rawls's assumptions about 
the motivation of the parties will reveal a more attractive alternative 
to both the maximin rule and Rawls's principles. 
The Satisfactory Minimum: An Alternative to the Maximin Rule 
Rawls argues that his two principles of justice represent the 
maximin solution to the choice of principles under uncertainty. 
When applying the maximin rule to several alternative sets of 
possible outcomes, individuals assume that the least favorable 
outcome in each alternative set of possible outcomes will obtain, 
and then choose the course of action which provides for the best 
result in these unhappy circumstances. For instance, if I were to 
apply the maximin rule to a choice about the basic structure of 
society in which my place in society is uncertain, then I would 
choose as if my worst enemy were in charge of assigning me that 
place. Or, to give a more abstract example, let us consider the table 
below. 
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Diagram 4: The Maximin Rule 
Decisions cl 
Circumstances 
/ c2 cl 
12 
9 
8 
let dl-d3 represent the possible dl 
choices available to the chooser d2 
and let cl-c3 represent the possible d3 
0 3 
4 7 
5 6 
outcomes which may obtain 
Given the possible choices dl-d3, the maximin solution is d3, as 
the worst possible outcome under d3 (the value 5) is better than the 
worst possible outcome under dl (the value 0) and dl (the value 
If it were indeed rational for the parties to use this rule, then 
parties would consider only the position of the worst-off when 
ranking alternative conceptions of justice, and it seems quite 
plausible that they would prefer Rawls's principles to a social safety 
net, or indeed to any alternative principle of justice. But why is it 
plausible to argue, as Rawls does, that parties in the original position 
would rank competing conceptions of justice according to this 
unusually conservative rule? Rawls admits that the maximin rule 
is not a rule which is fit for all decisions. However, he argues, the 
maximin rule is well suited to choices in situations marked by certain 
special features. In particular, Rawls singles out three features of 
choice situations which make the maximin rule attractive: 
(1) Knowledge of the likelihoods of the different 
possible outcomes of the decis ion is 
impossible. 
(2) Parties making the decision care very little 
for possible gains above the minimum that 
they can assure themselves of by using the 
maximin rule. 
(3) Non-maximin options have poss ible 
outcomes that the decision-maker can hardly 
accept, [p. 154] 
Rawls argues that the original position realizes all three of these 
features; indeed, he writes that "the original position has been 
4). 
116 AUSLEGUNG 
defined so that it is a situation in which the maximin rule applies." 
[p. 155] But do these features really apply to the original position? 
Consider feature (2), that parties making the decision care very 
little for possible gains above the minimum that they can assure 
themselves of by using the maximin rule. This appears to imply 
that Rawls's two principles, as the maximin solution to the choice 
problem in the original position, can guarantee to all of the members 
of society a satisfactory standard of living. Yet we have already 
discussed the possibility that some societies will be unable to 
provide a satisfactory standard of living to all. Because the choice 
of principles should not depend on the contingent circumstances 
of a particular society, there is no legitimate way to rule out this 
possibility, and therefore no such guarantee can be made from the 
original position for any conception of justice, including Rawls's 
own. 
In such a society (as Diagram 1 illustrates), the minimum that 
the parties can assure themselves of by using the maximin rule is, 
as it turns out, still unsatisfactory. In these circumstances, feature 
(2) is not realized: the parties making the decision may care very 
much about possible gains above the minimum that they can assure 
themselves of by using the maximin rule; specifically, those gains 
which will elevate them from that position to one allowing a 
reasonably satisfactory standard of living. (Looking back to the 
table in Diagram 4, it is as though the parties require a score of at 
least 6.5 to achieve a satisfactory material minimum. In such cases, 
it would no longer be true that the parties care very little for gains 
above the maximin guarantee of 5.) 
I believe that Rawls's error is to assume that the minimum 
promised by the two principles of justice will be a satisfactory 
minimum. For instance, he writes that 
if we can maintain that these principles provide a 
workable theory of social justice, and that they are 
compatible with reasonable demands of efficiency, 
then this conception guarantees a satisfactory 
minimum. There may be, on reflection, little reason 
for trying to do better, [p. 156] 
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And again, when discussing the risks of choosing utilitarianism, 
Rawls argues that 
Since the parties have the alternative of the two 
principles of justice, they can in large part sidestep 
the uncertainties of the original position. They can 
guarantee the protection of their liberties and a 
reasonably satisfactory standard of life as the 
conditions of their society permit, [p. 169] 
To be sure, Rawls is at liberty to argue that the two principles of 
justice will lead an impoverished society to develop in ways such 
that all members of society will eventually be guaranteed a 
satisfactory minimum material standard of living. Nonetheless, this 
does not allow the parties in the original position to discount the 
possibility that they may find themselves in an impoverished society 
before such changes have taken effect. Indeed, given what we 
already know about the conservative nature of the parties, it seems 
likely that they will consider this possible situation to be of greater 
importance than situations of abundance. Thus, no such guarantees 
can be made from the original position, and there is, unfortunately, 
no way to sidestep its uncertainties. 
Because the maximum minimum and the satisfactory minimum 
of a given choice situation need not be the same, parties presented 
with the table in Diagram 4 would not necessarily be inclined to 
choose the maximin solution d3 merely because it guarantees that 
they can do no worse than a value of 5, as a value of 5 may still be 
unsatisfactory. Imagine that the table in Diagram 4 represents a 
situation in which only values of 6.5 or higher are acceptable. Parties 
in such a situation would be better off neglecting d3 for choice d2, 
in which they have a better chance of securing for themselves a 
satisfactory value. But how can we say this in light of stipulation 
(1), that there is no way of assessing probabilities? There is in fact 
a limited way of assessing probabilities. The parties may presume 
that the probability of outcome c2 is greater than zero (otherwise 
the exercise is meaningless), and that choice d2 yields an acceptable 
value (the value 7) under outcome c2 while choice d3 yields an 
unacceptable value (the value 6); also, there are no possible 
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outcomes in which choice d3 yields an acceptable value while 
choice dl does not. Thus, a person choosing dl does have a higher 
probability of securing an acceptable score than does a person 
choosing d3. Similarly, as demonstrated in Diagram 1, in situations 
of scarcity the social safety net provides a satisfactory standard of 
living to some who would not enjoy a satisfactory standard of living 
under the alternative. 
What, then, can we say about feature (3), that non-maximin 
solutions have possible outcomes that the decision maker can hardly 
accept? While it is true that the social safety net includes the 
possibility of unsatisfactory outcomes, so do Rawls's principles, 
and so would any principles given a society in which there is not 
enough to provide a good life for all. To be sure, Rawls's special 
conception of justice avoids the atrocities sometimes imagined by 
critics of utilitarianism—the priority of liberty ensures that none 
will be enslaved or coerced. However, the social safety net which I 
have endorsed also incorporates the priority of liberty and the same 
guarantee. But no principles of justice can guarantee a satisfactory 
standard of living from the original position which Rawls sets forth. 
And what of cases in which a society has more than enough to 
provide a satisfactory standard of living to all its of members? First, 
we should keep in mind that, given the conservative nature of the 
parties, they would be less worried about situations of abundance 
than about situations of scarcity. Nonetheless, let us consider the 
table in Diagram 4 yet again, this time imagining that scores of 3.5 
and higher are acceptable. This is enough to rule out some possible 
choices (such as choice dl), but would not provide rational grounds 
for choosing between dl and d3. There seems to me to be no good 
reason for parties to refuse to gamble in such a case, as long as 
they are still guaranteed a good life. 
Therefore, I suggest an alternative to the maximin rule: that in 
situations of uncertainty of outcomes, parties should attempt to 
determine which outcomes are satisfactory, and then choose 
whichever course of action presents the best chance of achieving 
one of the satisfactory outcomes. Using a principle similar to this 
one, parties in the original position would choose principles which 
guaranteed them the best chance of living a satisfactory life—that 
is, principles under which as many people as is possible have the 
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primary goods necessary to pursue satisfactory lives. As I think the 
diagrams in the previous section make clear, this is best achieved 
by a system including a social safety net. 
Further Considerations 
While the original position is a useful device for making vivid 
the restrictions which seem reasonable to impose on arguments for 
or against competing conceptions of justice, it still cannot resolve 
disputes regarding what restrictions are reasonable and which are 
not. Put another way, we might say that different ideas about what 
are the reasonable restrictions to place on arguments for principles 
of justice would lead to different conceptions of the original 
position. As many of Rawls's critics have pointed out, the original 
position which Rawls sets forth already reflects, to some degree, 
Rawls's own conception of justice and the relevant considerations 
which lead to a conception of justice. Therefore, it is argued, the 
original position which Rawls describes is biased toward the 
selection of his principles. 
This seems reasonable—for instance, if parties in the original 
position had knowledge of their natural abilities and talents, then 
the more talented would probably not agree to the difference 
principle. However, I would like to point out that the social safety 
net may not be as vulnerable to this objection. For instance, the 
talented would still not know exactly how events will play out, and 
they might see good reason to guarantee themselves a minimum 
(or their best chance at a minimum) against risk while still leaving 
open the possibility of great gains if their talents are recognized. 
Even a Wilt Chamberlain might wish to insure himself against injury 
or social conditions in which his talents are not appreciated (for 
instance, if the only lucrative spectator sport in a society were horse 
racing). Thus, I think that support for this more moderate conception 
of justice can be generated at almost any level of abstraction from 
actual contingencies. All we need to do is ask, "What if things 
hadn't turned out the way they did?" to feel the attraction of a 
safety net to protect us from the unforeseeable. 
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Rawlsian Counter-objections 
Given the argument laid out here, what might a committed 
Rawlsian argue in support of the difference principle? As we have 
seen, there are two general socioeconomic situations on which these 
principles of justice can be contrasted and contested: situations of 
scarcity and situations of superabundance. With regard to situations 
of scarcity, a Rawlsian line of argument might press on the notion 
of a satisfactory minimum as the criterion of judgment. A Rawlsian 
might contend that the argument which I have presented so far 
seems to artificially reduce a spectrum of outcomes down to two 
possibilities: satisfactory and unsatisfactory. Even if we accept that 
we can draw a line between satisfactory allotments of primary goods 
and unsatisfactory ones (which, it must be admitted, is a provocative 
claim in its own right), we should note that there are degrees of 
"unsatisfactoriness." From the position of the worst-off, the 
difference between the social safety net and the difference principle 
might be the difference between extreme poverty and somewhat 
milder poverty. 
I suspect that this argument may boil down to a matter of 
priorities. After all, both the maximin rule and the satisfactory 
minimum rule may be considered conservative: one guarantees the 
greatest allotment of goods that can be guaranteed, while the other 
guarantees the greatest likelihood of a satisfactory allotment of 
goods. I, for one, find the notion of a satisfactory minimum more 
compelling. There also seems to be support for this general idea in 
the broader political culture: when we speak, for instance, of a 
decent standard of living or more generally of a good life. What I 
think we find troubling about the presence of poverty in our society 
is not that there are inequalities which exist which are not to the 
advantage of the impoverished, but instead that individuals must 
unnecessarily endure standards of living which are inhumane and 
living conditions which are unacceptable. 
With regard to situations of superabundance, a Rawlsian might 
press on the possibility of extreme inequalities. Consider a society 
in which the vast majority lives at the bare minimum for a 
satisfactory existence, while a small handful enjoys extreme wealth 
and privilege, far in excess of their fellow citizens. Such a society 
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is, at least hypothetical ly, acceptable under a social safety net, but 
is there nothing in such extreme inequality to arouse our sense of 
injustice? Shouldn't we be concerned with the possibility that the 
social safety net might allow for the creation of a hyper-privileged 
class lording over an underclass which subsists at the minimum? 
While I consider such a situation unlikely, the probability of 
the scenario introduced is somewhat besides the point: the point of 
the objection is that if this scenario came about, we would have 
reason to consider it unjust. However, I am unconvinced that this 
extreme situation, at least in the negative terms in which it has 
been described, would be allowed under the social safety net. I 
believe that what offends our sense of justice is the suggestion of 
the kind of persisting inequality which exists in our society, in which 
the possessors of wealth and privilege pass on these advantages to 
their children in the form of superior education and fuller 
opportunity, and in which the offspring of the disadvantaged are 
excluded from crucial opportunities for success and advancement. 
This is the kind of situation suggested by the talk of class distinctions 
arising within our hypothetical society: a small and wealthy 
privileged class enjoying advantages over a larger underclass. 
While the social safety net is more tolerant of inequalities than 
is the difference principle—the social safety net does not require 
that inequalities be justified with reference to the life prospects of 
the least advantaged—it would still not allow for these persisting, 
class inequalities. This is because the conception of justice which I 
have advanced retains the requirement of fair equality of 
opportunity. I consider it a central requirement of social justice 
that each individual have equal access to the avenues of personal 
growth and enhancement, and I do not believe that this equality of 
access is threatened by the set of principles which I have described. 
Therefore, to the extent that a society organized under the proposed 
conception of justice could have a class structure, it would have to 
be a fluid and therefore, I think, less objectionable class structure. 
